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An Ecumenical
Horizon for "Canon
Within a Canon"?
Patrick R. Keifert
Associate Professor of Systematic Theology
Luther Northwestern Seminary, St. Paul, Minnesota
Can our interpretation of Scripture be ecumenical in our pluralistic situation and still
use the Lutheran Confessions' principle of
the "canon within a canon"? No, if certain
prevailing conceptions of ecumenical, pluralistic, and "a canon within a canon," prevail. Yes, if they are construed differently.
Within this different construing of the ecumenical horizon, we are ecumenical in our
pluralistic situation by rendering public our
specific confession, not through an appeal to
some supposed irrefutable uniform common
human experience, but through a thick, that
is, complex, in-depth description of how we
believe, teach, and confess the God who is
disclosed in the Scriptures. The ecumenical
question is no longer an either/or question;
that is, either we have a canon within a
canon, or we do not. Rather, the ecumenical
question becomes, "Which canon within the
canon is relatively adequate?"
This construing of a "canon within the
canon" within an ecumenical horizon has
three major elements. First, since being ecumenical and being public are interrelated,
ecumenical conversation is best understood
as the interplay of strangers rather than inti-

mates. Second, since being ecumenical and
public involves the interpreter in a pluralistic
situation, a model for interpreting Scripture
in a pluralistic situation is needed. Third, a
canon within a canon is best understood as a
principle for the use of Scripture in Christian
witness and an inherent part of rendering a
Christian witness in a pluralistic public.
Therefore, the public articulation of a canon
within a canon is an indispensible part of
scriptural interpretation in an ecumenical
horizon.

Being Ecumenical
and Public
Being ecumenical and being public belong together because, in a primal sense, being ecumenical is thinking, willing, and laboring with the world as our horizon.1 The
^ e etymology for ecumenical is the Greek
oikumene whichfigurativelyextends the sense of the
word house (oikos) to include the world of Hellenistic civilization. Cf. Taschenlexikon Religion und
Theologie 4 (Göttingen, 1983): 38 for the development of the usage of the word ecumenical, including
in the modern Ecumenical Movement.
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original councils were ecumenical because
they functioned with the world as their horizon. This primal sense needs to be retrieved
so that Christian ecumenism, in the words of
Raimundo Panikkar, "cannot be reduced to
settling Christian family feuds, as it were, or
healing old wounds."2

eing ecumenical
means we need to act
publicly.
This version of being ecumenical, which
has the world as its horizon, means we need
to act publicly; that is, to act in a res publica.
"A res publica stands in general for those
bonds of association and mutual commitment which exist between people who are
not joined together by ties of family or intimate association. . . ."3 The bonds which
characterize public association are the
bonds of the crowd in which there are various degrees of unfamiliarity and even conflict. The question of being ecumenical is integrally tied with being public, and this
implies working with strangers.4
Some would avoid this integration of public and ecumenical with respect to the
church by understanding the church primarily through metaphors of friendship or family. And, while it is not uncommon to conceive of the church as the family of
God—indeed, there is some biblical 5
warrant—or of all people as brothers and

sisters, such images of the church and humanity can obscure the very real differences
among the churches.6
The tendency to understand ecumenical
conversation in the intimate language of
friendship or family is neither simple nor benign. It exemplifies the morals of middleclass people in society7 and implicitly agrees
to the "field of action" which has been allotted to religion in the bourgeois milieu of a
secularized society.8 In short, religion is considered a private matter, mostly for women,
children, and other intimates.9
Some of the dominant images of ecumenical work often use this intimate imagery and
inadvertently further an imperial relationship between first world Christianity and
other peoples. For example, Leonard
Swidler, editor oí Journal of Ecumenical
Studies, recently proposed ten commandments for interreligious dialog which can be
easily understood within the intimate model

2
Raimundo Panikkar, "Toward an Ecumenical
Ecumenism," injournal of Ecumenical Studies

19(1982)781.
3
Richard Senne«. The Fall of Public Man: On the
Social Psychology of Capitalism (New York: Random House, 1978), 3; hereafter, Senne«, "The Fall."
4
See Senne«, "The Fall," 48, for a definition of
stranger in relationship to public.
5
Paul S. Minear, Images of the Church in the
New Testament (Philadelphia: Westminster, I960),
136-72.
6
For an analysis of the power of metaphor in
construing a world read Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of
MetapboHJoronto: University of Toronto Press,
1975); especially, 295 fi.
7
Cf. Juan Luis Segundo, The Liberation of Theology (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1976), 8-42.
8
Peter Berger, The Sacred Canopy (New York:
Doubleday, 1967), 134-35.
9
Patrick Keifert, "Modern Dogma and Iirargical
Renewal," Currents in Theology and Mission
13(1986):2l4-27.
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for ecumenical conversation. He makes
much of sincerity, trust, self-definition, and
experiencing the partner's religion "from
within."10 In the following issue of the journal, a pastoral counselor develops Swidler's
decalogue along the lines of the therapeutic
interview!11 These individuals would not wish
to support an imperial relationship, Swidler
explicitly requires in his seventh commandment that "dialogue can take place only between equals." The problem is not in most of
the ingredients of die decalogue but in the
organizing metaphor. The metaphor of intimate conversation as the model for ecumenical conversation fosters an imperial relationship, since it abets a first world middle
class conception of public conversation and
the place of religion in society.
By way of contrast, my rendition of ecumenical interrelates being ecumenical with
being public in a pluralistic situation, including socio-economic plurality. The church in
ecumenical conversation is more a "company of strangers" in public conversation
than a dialogue of intimates.12 Such a pluralistic horizon implies a conflictive, though not
combative, model of human communication,
since conversation involves such pervasive
systematic distortions as class, race, and
sex.13

Models for Responding
to Diversity
Being ecumenical and public demands a
keen sense of diversity. There are, however,
a spectrum of responses to this diversity.
This spectrum begins with those who hold
that, despite our differences, we really are all
alike, and it ends with those who hold that, at
least for the moment, our differences are so

profound that there is no ground for carrying
on a public conversation. Most people fit
somewhere in the middle. I describe four
models for responding to diversity. The first
three models are used to describe what I believe are unhelpful models14 for responding
to diversity;15 the fourth, articulating a canon
within a canon, is the one I prefer.

The Monist
The monist person or group recognizes
the existence of diversity in the ways in which
Scripture may be interpreted, butfinallydenies serious consideration of the options
other than its own. The monist is quite sure
that the other options are wrong. Some monists may be uninterested in conversation
about interpreting Scripture. They consider
it a waste of time. Others take up the conver-

10
Leonard Swidler, "The Dialogue Decalogue:
Ground Rules for Interreligious Dialogue,"Journal of
Ecumenical Studies 20 (1983): 1-4.
1
Robert L. Kinast, "The Dialogue Decalogue: A
Pastoral Commentary," Journal of Ecumenical
Studies 21 (1984) :318.
12
Parker J. Palmer, The Company ofStrangers
(New York: Crossroad, 1985).
13
The importance of a different model of public
conversation is the subject of major philosophical
discussion which is directly related to our topic of
hermeneutics. Cf. Jürgen Habermas, "Zu Gadamers
'Wahrheit und Methode,' " in Apel und Habermas
Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik, 53.
14
In order to avoid more abstraction, I personify
these models. The danger of personification is apparent. While it is true few people function exclusively in
one mode in their response to diversity, these models
represent viable and common ways persons actually
function, at least in specific situations.
15
Cf. Wayne C Booth, Critical Understanding:
The Power and Limits of Pluralism (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1979) for a more extensive description of these four models.
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sation at great length only to confirm their
own perspective.
A monist can be an irenic, gentle conversation partner. For example, the pastoral
counselor who considers all conflict regarding the interpretation of God the Father in
Scripture to be a result of conflicts with parents, is a monist regarding the interpretation
of Scripture, since the interpretive perspective is singular. This person does not work in
a critical, pluralistic horizon. In each case,
the monists have confidence in the truth of
their perspective. The monist intends to
change the dialogue partner, but not be
changed by the conversation.

The Eclectic
The eclectic person or group recognizes
diversity and is quite willing to dialogue with
the various positions. Unlike the monist, the
eclectic to a certain extent takes seriously the
conversation partners' positions. Bits of each
of the diverse options are valid, while other
bits are false. "It is naive to expect any one
book, any one theologian, any one mode, to
be fully sound or fully mistaken. Thus we
should incorporate the good and throw away
the bad," argues the eclectic. The eclectic
picks and chooses from the many options,
incorporating those which fit the pragmatic
purposes of the eclectic. The eclectic intends
to change the dialogue partner and to be
changed but only on the basis of personal,
pragmatic purposes which tend not to be a
matter of public discussion.

The Relativist
The relativist recognizes diversity but\ believes that public discourse regarding different interpretive options is unlikely, since

each side represents values that are not subject to rational discourse. As a result of this
skepticism regarding public discourse, the
relativist calls together all those persons who
share the same value judgments and forms a
society of like-minded persons. Within this
group the rules for participation may be
strict or lenient, but they are set by the group
which holds those value judgments. It is as if
the relativist, shrugging her shoulders, says,
"I know my values are no truer than any others, but what can I do? You leave me alone
and I will leave you alone. Inside our groups
we live by our values." The relativist finally
intends on changing others and being
changed only to the extent that their tolerant
isolation is preserved; at all costs conflict is
to be avoided. The result is a "repressive tolerance, "16

The Critical Pluralist
The critical pluralist recognizes diversity,
but believes that public discourse regarding
religious affection is possible and necessary.
Working from the roots of their own traditions, critical pluralists engage others from
the standpoint of the others' own tradition
and commitments. Tradition, understood as
"the living faith of the dead," is no longer

l6
David Tracy, AnalogicalImagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism (New
York: Crossword, 1981), xi and Hans Küng, "Towards an Ecumenical Theology of Religions: Some
Theses for Clarification," in Concilium (Edinburgh:
T. &T. Clark, Ltd., Feb., 1986):120.
17
For a sustained discussion of tradition understood in the manner in which I use it here, especially
the notion offruitfulprejudice, compare Hans-Georg
Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode Q. C B. Mohr:
Tübingen, 1965), 250-84; cf. Tracy, Analogical
Imagination, 234-41.
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considered the enemy of public conversation, but rather the very means of such conversation in a pluralistic situation.17 Critical
conflict, understood as healthy critical suspicions of the ways in which public discourse
can be distorted, is welcomed rather than
avoided.18

he critical
pluralist
expects to be changed
by the conversation.
The critical pluralist expects to change
others and be changed by the conversation.
The conversation is understood as a public
interplay of strangers where private selfconsciousness is peripheral. The image of an
ecumenical conversation as a company of
strangers constituted through tradition and
healthy critical suspicions replaces the imagery of intimacy.
This is a sketchy outline of the spectrum
of possibilities. The critical pluralist model
needs to be developed in relation to the others, especially the relativist. Relativism leads
to individuals who are strange Dr. Jekyl, Mr.
Hyde persons. They are private legalists and
public anarchists. Biblical scholars, who follow this pattern, tend to divide interpretation
between what the text meant and what it now
means.19 As a result, as one biblical scholar
puts it, "Biblical scholarship. . . often oscillates between critical description and capricious faith calling the one 'historical' and the

other 'theological.' "20 Among theologians
whofitwithin this model, one observes a certain private dogmatism and public skepticism. They often borrow from contemporary
skeptical philosophers to argue their relativism. 21 Within their own tradition-value
group, within themselves, they have a strong
commitment to a very fixed set of ethical and
religious beliefs and values. Publicly they
make no argument for their position. At the
public table they perceive their value system
as private.
In contrast, critical pluralism recognizes
the diversity of religious experience but assumes that it can be made public. The critical
pluralist is like the monist in that the critical
pluralist makes judgments regarding other
religious witness. Unlike the monist, the critical pluralist chooses to make such arguments public, making arguments that are
necessary and sufficient for reasonable and
fair-minded people. Most importantly, the
critical pluralist expects to be changed by the
conversation, not on the basis of intimacy
with the various conversation partners, but
through the conversation itself.

18
Jürgen Habermas, "Historical Materialism and
the Development of Normative Structures," in Communication and the Evolution of Society (Boston:
Beacon, 1979).
19
Krister Stendahl, "Biblical Theology, Contemporary," m Interpreters Dictionary of the Bible 1
(Nashville: Abingdon) :418-32.
20
Martin J. Buss, Encounter with the Text (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979), 33.
21
Cf. George A. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Post-liberal Age
(Philadelphia: Westminister, 1984); hereafter, Lindbeck, Nature ofDoctrine; Cf. Patrick Keifert, "Labor
Room or Morgue: The Power and Limits of Pluralism
and Christology," in Word and World 5 (1985), 7888.
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Canon Within a Canon
Thefirsttwo parts of this construing of an
ecumenical horizon for a "canon within a
canon" are complete. Such an ecumenical horizon is pluralistic and public. As a public
conversation it is among strangers and, while
dependent upon tradition, critical of both
tradition and novelty as potential distortions
of the conversation. The interpretation of
Scripture within this public and pluralistic
setting is best accomplished by a critical pluralist strategy. The critical pluralist strategy
begins by thorough description of how we
believe, teach, and confess the God who is
disclosed in the Scriptures. This description
works out of tradition with a full set of
healthy, critical suspicions and expects that
this tradition will look significantly different
as a result of the conversation.

The third part of the construing remains;
namely, a description of "a canon within a
canon." The argument is fairly simple: Any
attempt to interpret Scripture according to
this critical pluralist strategy will reveal a
canon within a canon. Canon within a canon
is not one portion of Scripture over another
or an ahistorical idea which norms the text.

Rather, it is specifically the set of uses to
which a particular interpretation puts the
text and the principles of interpretation
which this interpretation reveals. Every interpretation reveals such principles of use and
interpretation. As a result, the ecumenical
question becomes one of the relatively adequate canon within a canon. A brief description of what in principle a canon within a
canon should and should not be follows.
Since the task of critical pluralists is to
render public their witness to the faith, they
are committed to raising the question of
truth in at least two important senses. Is the
witness I give truly Christian and is it true?22
Theological hermeneutics becomes an essential component of judging whether the
witness is truly Christian, its "Christian aptness." In order to make this judgment, theological hermeneutics clarifies the canon, or
rule of Christian witness. This canon is Scripture.
Here it is crucial to distinguish the function of Scripture as canon and its function as
source of Christian witness. Placing the focus
solely on the canonical function of Scripture
downplays, even denies, the historical character of these texts. Though at its worst this
leads to prooftexting, it does not warrant forsaking the canonical function. Attending only
to the function of Scripture as the source of
Christian witness, on the other hand, leaves
us with an incomprehensible collection of
data about the text of Scripture. As Charles
Woods puts it, "The result of this confusion

22
In the following analysis I am indebted to the
work of Charles M. Wood, the Formation of Christian Understanding (Philadelphia: Westminister,
1981), 82-120; hereafter, Wood, Formation.
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of source and norm may range from the uncritical enforcement of random scriptural
texts as normative, to the serious erosion of
any clear idea as to how Scripture might
function to authorize Christian witness at
all."23 The key is to balance these two functions of source and norm with one another.24

Function and
Canonical Status
In considering canon within a canon,
however, the canonical function is central.
The canonization of Christian Scriptures is
not so much exalting them to some metaphysically higher status, but more the actual
practice of using them as the norm of the
Christian witness. The canonical status does
not depend upon the intention of their authors or even the intention of those who originally gathered them together or who spent
time developing lists of canonical texts.
Rather, canonical status depends precisely
on their functioning in the community.
Since canonical status is tied to the function of these texts, the question becomes to
what purposes do they actually and should
they actually serve. Any answer to that question is what I take to be that interpretation's
canon within the canon.
Since the idea of a canon within a canon
is an elastic notion, it is important to note
which senses of the notion are excluded by
defining it in this manner. It has meant to
some that a particular text or group of texts
or a particular theme or affirmation of Scripture is taken as central, warranting exclusion
of others. Thus at one time or another, the
notion of the canon within a canon legitimated the setting of the New Testament
against the Old, the synoptics against John,

the Pauline letters against the Catholic and
Pastoral Epistles, etc.25 While significant theological differences exist between the testaments and various parts of the New Testament witness, the canon within a canon does
not warrant either one portion of Scripture
being excluded by another, or some supposedly "ahistoricaT idea replacing the particulars of the biblical narrative.
The whole of the narrative must be construed in the use of the canon, not just part.
Therefore, the use of Scripture as canon will
deploy various methods of biblical interpretation so as to understand the text as a
whole.26 This is not to reject the importance
of the various stages of oral and textual development. However, it does mean that historical critical methods, which tend to dissect the text when understanding the text as a
historical source, function differently when
understanding the text canonically. They are
no less reasonable or critical; they are, however, deployed to a different purpose.27 In
the canonical use of Scripture they are deployed so as to understand the whole text
complete with its full range of referentiality.

2i

Wood, Formation, 85.
In this regard, Gerhard Ebeling's " 'Sola
Scriptum' and Tradition," in The Word of God and
Tradition (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1964), 102147, remains a significant contribution to this discussion.
25
Krister Stendahl, "One Canon is Enough," in
Meanings: The Bible as Document and as Guide
(Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984), 62f.
26
Patrick R. Keifert, "Mind Reader and Maestro:
Models for Understanding Biblical Interpreters,"
Word and World 1 (1980/81) :153-68.
27
Patrick R. Keifert, "Interpretive Paradigms: A
Proposal Concerning New Testament Christology,"
24

&WK?W30(1985):203-14.
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In principle, the focus in canonical use of
Scripture is on the plain sense of Scripture
(sensus literalis). Such use presumes that
the purpose of conversation is a commonly
held interpretation of the text.28 The goal is
what Clifford Geertz calls a "thick description" of the biblical witness. It is, first, a description of the details which make up the
whole. Second, it is description from the participant's point of view.29 The interpreter recognizes that any description that the interpreter makes "from the participant's point of
view," will be the interpreter's version. The
focus for this method of interpretation is to
understand the text as a whole taking seriously, rather than explaining away, its details
and point of view. In short, the text is understood as a whole: the whole truth and nothing but the whole's truth.

hat uses
are appropriate for Scripture?
But, as Ernst Käsemann has pointed out, it
is one thing to say that all of Scripture should
be heard, but it is something else to say that
one can or should preach it all.30 All of Scripture should be taken into account when determining how the critical pluralist bears witness in the public place. But the canon itself
raises serious questions as to the propriety of
"preaching" some of its constituent parts,
that is, of commending and explicating them
as sources or standards of authentic Christian witness. So while the whole of Scripture

must be construed in its canonical use, not
all of it will be used in the same manner or
force in the ultimate Christian witness.
Appropriate use is the question addressed by "canon within a canon." What
uses are appropriate for Scripture? What is
Scripture authorized to do and what can it
authorize? The Lutheran Confessors took
these questions as critical. They regularly
balanced the principle of sola scriptum with
those of solus Christus, sola fide, and sola
gratia, not as external principles imported
into the text but as their interpretation of the
Scripture's central witness. This interpretation neither excludes one portion of Scripture nor creates ahistorical ideas as criteria.
It does provide explicit criteria for the canonical use of the Scripture in the church.
Especially in the American setting, where the
Protestant tendency is to exalt Scripture to
"the status of absolute norm," it is important
to contribute the Lutheran refusal tofixateon
canon. It is Jesus Christ, not Scripture, who is
norma normans sed non normata for he is
the appropriate end and content to any canonical use of Scripture.

28
Thiemann, Revelation and Theology, 65-70,
where he accurately critiques Wood's and Kelsey's
functional reductionism precisely on the issue of the
plain sense of Scripture. He is dependent here on
HansW. Frei, "Theology and the Interpretation of
Narrative: Some Hermeneutical Considerations,"
paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Academy of Religion, New York, December,
1982.
29
Clifford Geertz, the Interpretation of Cultures
(New York: Basic Books, 1973), 13-27.
30
Ernst Käsemann, "Kritische Analyse," in Das
Neue Testament als Kanon (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck
and Ruprecht, 1970), 366.
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The Confessors'
Public Commitment
This version of the principle of canon
within a canon within an ecumenical horizon
places the interpretation of the Lutheran
Confessions in a different light. They are not
canon law or its functional Lutheran equivalent. Their varied and occasional character
within their complex social, economic, political, and theological context, functions as a
superb example of how Christians, under extremely hazardous and systematically distorted circumstances, make their public witness. These confessors' commitment to a
public, ecumenical horizon is as important
as the particular way they put their witness.
As Robert Bertram so eloquently put it in an
address before the 1968 Assembly of the
World Council of Churches:
In my own immediate tradition, to cite
but one example, over four centuries
ago our confessors challenged their
posterity to what could have been the
boldest sort of ecumenical dialog. It
could still be that. In full view of the
empire of their day, they invoked on
their confession not only the verdict of
"God" and of His "Christ" but of "all
nations" as well, "of all pious people"
(Apology, Preface 17, 19; Art. XXVTII,
27; Art. IV, 398). In effect, they were
opening their books to public audit by
the whole church.31
In this sense, the Lutheran Confessions commit their posterity to a public and ecumenical Christian witness. Their witness under
their circumstances criticizes today's privatization and individualization of the Christian
religion in major portions of Christianity and
urges us not to accept these boundaries.

Once we accept this public commitment
in our pluralistic setting, the inevitability of a
canon within a canon arising in any attempt
to render public a Christian witness also becomes evident. It is better to have a canon
within a canon be an explicit part of the public conversation, as it is in the Lutheran Confessions, than for it to be a covert part of that
conversation. An explicit canon within the
canon compels a more critical, truthful, and
helpful ecumenical conversation.

31

Robert W. Bertram, 'Our Common Confession
and Its Implications for Today," Concordia Theological Monthly 39 (Nov. 1968) :715-21.
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